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A CRISIS IN FEDERAL HABEAS LAW
Eve Brensike Primus*
HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND

By Nancy J. King and Joseph L.
Hoffinann. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
2011. Pp. xi, 255. $45.
THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT.

INTRODUCTION

Everyone recognizes that federal habeas doctrine is a mess.1 Despite
repeated calls for reform, 2 federal judges continue to waste countless hours

reviewing habeas petitions only to dismiss the vast majority of them on procedural grounds.3 Broad change is necessary, but to be effective, such change
must be animated by an overarching theory that explains when federal courts
should exercise habeas jurisdiction. In Habeasfor the Twenty-First Century:
Uses, Abuses, and the Future of the Great Writ, Professors Nancy King4 and
Joseph Hoffmann5 offer such a theory. Drawing on history, current practice,
and empirical data, King and Hoffmann find unifying themes that not only

explain our past use of the Great Writ but also give guidance regarding how
we should interpret the writ going forward.
To their credit, the book is comprehensive in ways that most literature on
habeas is not. To date, habeas scholarship has often been bifurcated: federal
courts experts have written about executive detentions, 6 and criminal

*

Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.

1. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 253
(1988) ("[T]he rules governing access to habeas review have become hopelessly confusing
and confused."); Larry Yackle, FederalHabeas Corpus in a Nutshell, HUM. RTS., Summer
2001, at 8 ("[F]ederal habeas corpus is bogged down in Byzantine procedural snarls that not
only frustrate the enforcement of constitutional rights but also squander time and resources.").
2. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970); Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Essay, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 791 (2009).
3. See NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE
PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
(2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf [hereinafter KING
REPORT].
4. Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
5. Harry Pratter Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
6. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007).
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procedure scholars have written about federal review of criminal convictions. 7
By considering the role of habeas corpus in every context from executive
detentions to reviews of state and federal criminal convictions to sentence
administration claims, King and Hoffmann offer new and exciting insights
about what drives the expansion and contraction of habeas corpus doctrine.
They elegantly demonstrate how the federal courts historically have used
habeas as a tool to restore the governmental balance of power on occasions
when a significant societal change or crisis has placed that balance in
serious jeopardy (p. viii). They emphasize the importance of ensuring that
federal courts have the flexibility to deploy the writ when necessary to
combat government overreaching (p. 12). Yet, at the same time, King and
Hoffmann recognize that the writ must not be overused, lest it lose its
respected status (p. 66). Balancing the need for flexibility against the need
for prudence, they explain, is the only way to ensure effective habeas reform
going forward (p. 86).
Habeasfor the Twenty-First Century is a wonderful book. It is nuanced
while still being thorough, and it explains fairly technical material in an engaging and interesting way. It is probably the most accessible overview of
the contours of the Great Writ that I have read. Its breadth, however, is also
the source of one of its problems. King and Hoffmann want both to identify
the overarching themes that can explain habeas in all of its diverse forms
(p. viii) and to make concrete proposals for reform that have a reasonable
chance of being adopted (p. ix). These two goals, however, are often in tension. What is politically feasible is not always consistent with their
interpretive approach. Rather than admit this tension and explain why they
choose one goal over the other, King and Hoffmann sometimes stretch their
definition of what constitutes a crisis worthy of habeas intervention in an
attempt to make it fit their reform proposals.
This is particularly true in the context of their approach to federal review
of state criminal convictions. In that context, King and Hoffmann use history to argue that habeas's primary role is to intervene whenever a federalism
crisis places the balance of power between the federal and state governments in jeopardy (p. 49). Such a federalism crisis exists, they say, only
when a state rejects federal law because it is federal.8 According to King
and Hoffmann, the propriety of habeas review does not depend on how frequently or egregiously a state violates its citizens' constitutional criminal
procedure rights. If the state does not act on the basis of an overt hostility to
federal law, the federal courts should not use habeas to intervene. 9 Nonetheless, King and Hoffmann's own proposal for reform contains provisions that
would allow state prisoners to file habeas claims, such as claims alleging

7. See, e.g., Hoffmann & King, supra note 2.
8. Pp. 66, 86; see also Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Right Problem; Wrong
Solution, 1 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 49, 53 (2010), http://www.califomialawreview.org/assets/
pdfs/Circuit/King31.pdf (emphasizing that federal habeas review of state court cases should
be limited to state court failures to vindicate federal rights "because they arefedera').
9. See Hoffman & King, supra note 8, at 53.
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actual innocence, even when there is no evidence that the states are hostile
to these claims because of their federal nature. So if King and Hoffmann's
proposals for reform are sound, their statement of the circumstances in
which federal habeas review is appropriate is too restrictive.
In this Review, I argue that King and Hoffmann should expand their
concept of what constitutes a crisis worthy of federal habeas intervention
to include situations in which a state systematically violates criminal defendants' federal rights or systematically fails to provide defendants with
adequate opportunities to vindicate those rights.'0 A state's entitlement to
autonomy and respect is at its nadir when the state routinely flouts federal
law, whereas the federal interest in using habeas review to catalyze structural reform in such a case is at its zenith. "1
King and Hoffmann are reluctant to expand their definition of crisis to
include these cases in part because they believe that restructuring federal
habeas review to address these claims is not politically viable. 2 They believe that their own proposal, in contrast, will appeal to both sides of the
political spectrum (p. ix). Specifically, they propose that Congress enact a
statute limiting habeas review of noncapital state criminal convictions to
cases involving retroactive applications of new law and claims of innocence
predicated on newly discovered evidence (pp. 91-92). They then propose to
use the resources saved by this streamlining to create a new federal initiative
designed to help states improve their indigent defense representation systems (pp. 87-88, 91-92). At first blush, this idea has the appeal of a grand
bargain, and King and Hoffmann make a helpfully provocative contribution
to the habeas debate by putting this possibility forward. That said, the particulars of their proposed bargain are not realistic enough to make it viable.
King and Hoffmann overestimate the cost savings that would accompany
their alleged streamlining of federal habeas review, and they underestimate
the expenditures required for their new federal initiative. As a result, their
proposal is not as politically feasible as they suggest.
In Part I of this Review, I describe King and Hoffmann's approach to
federal habeas review of state criminal convictions and explain both their
interpretive theory of federal habeas review and their specific reform proposals. In Part II, I analyze the mismatch between their theory that federal
habeas review should operate only during federalism crises and their proposals for reform. I also explain why I think that King and Hoffmann should
resolve this tension by expanding their definition of crisis to include situations where states systematically violate criminal defendants' constitutional
rights. In Part III, I contest the claim that King and Hoffmann's reform proposal is politically viable by showing that they have both underestimated the
costs of their new federal initiative and overestimated the savings that would
accompany their proposed streamlining of federal habeas review.
10. In so doing, I build on an idea that I previously discussed in Eve Brensike Primus,
A StructuralVision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2010).
11.
12.

See id. at 43.
See Hoffmann & King, supra note 8, at 55.

HeinOnline -- 110 Mich. L. Rev. 889 2011-2012

Michigan Law Review

I.

[Vol. 110:887

HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

In Habeasfor the Twenty-First Century, Nancy King and Joseph Hoff-

mann tell a compelling and enlightening story about the recent history of the
writ of habeas corpus. Federal habeas review, they explain, has always been
about providing the federal judiciary with a flexible and powerful tool to use
whenever a significant social or political crisis places the governmental balance of powers in serious jeopardy (pp. viii, 42, 68, 89). The writ must
remain flexible, they claim, to ensure that courts can use habeas aggressively when necessary to address these periodic crises (p. 136). However, courts
must also be prudent in their exercise of habeas jurisdiction so as to not devalue the Great Writ (p. 66). Habeas should therefore be used only as a last
resort, when other alternatives for judicial review are unavailable, and even
then only as a temporary avenue for judicial review of unlawful imprisonment claims (p. 168). Once the political or social crisis that prompted the
need for habeas review passes or adequate alternatives for judicial review
are created, habeas must recede (p. 91).
Guided by these core principles of flexibility and prudence, King and
Hoffmann make a number of proposals for reforming the current scope of
the writ. In the context of executive detentions without trial, they explain
that habeas review is "a vital structural protection for democracy and the
rule of law" (p. 21). They suggest that federal courts should use habeas aggressively whenever the federal executive, acting alone or in combination

with the legislature during a time of crisis, imprisons those it believes pose a
threat (p. 24). In such situations, habeas serves to adjust the balance of power among the three branches of government by protecting individual
liberties and curbing inappropriate governmental overreaching (p. 42).
When the federal courts' use of the writ becomes too common, the federal
legislature responds by developing alternative avenues for judicial review

and, in turn, the role of the writ recedes (p. 24).
In the context of federal review of state criminal convictions, King and
Hoffmann detect a similar pattern, with the natural variation that the balance
of power at stake in those cases is between the federal and state governments rather than between the branches of the federal government (p. 49).
They explain that during crises of federalism, when hostile states disregard

federally guaranteed rights, the federal courts should press habeas into service to release prisoners who would otherwise be left without adequate

remedies (pp. 64-65). Once the federalism crisis passes, however, federal
habeas review of state convictions should recede so as to prevent devaluation of the writ (pp. 64-65).

The problem today, King and Hoffmann claim, is that federal courts do
not act prudently in exercising their habeas jurisdiction in state court crimi-

nal cases (p. 90). In their view, the last federalism crisis occurred decades
ago, during the civil rights era, when the Supreme Court incorporated
criminal procedure rights against the states (pp. 54-60). King and Hoffmann argue that states have long since accepted the supremacy of federal
law and are today no longer hostile to federal claims just because they are
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federal (pp. 64-66). Thus, under their theory, federal habeas review of state
court criminal convictions should recede, but it has not done so (p. 66). As a
result, state prisoner petitions flood the federal courts, provoking Congress
to erect countless procedural barriers to federal habeas review (p. 66).
King and Hoffmann do a wonderful job of explaining how federal
habeas review "has become, in essence, a lottery" (p. 68). It is very
expensive and has no meaningful impact on the behavior of state officials
(p. 68). Relying on a comprehensive recent empirical study, 3 King and
Hoffmann argue that federal habeas is "utterly worthless to the vast majority
of state criminal defendants" (p. 169). Accordingly, they propose to
eliminate federal habeas review of state prisoner petitions in all but a very
narrow category of cases (pp. 91-92). They would condition their proposal
to streamline federal habeas review upon the creation of a new federal
initiative designed to help the states improve their defense representation
systems (pp. 87-88, 91-92). The money saved from curtailed federal habeas
review would thus enable a front-end reform that would promote quality
defense representation in the states, which King and Hoffmann believe will
go a long way toward ensuring that defendants' rights are better protected
(pp. 87-88).
Notably, King and Hoffmann exempt from their proposal claims
involving retroactive applications of new law, claims of innocence
predicated on newly discovered evidence, and capital cases (pp. 91-92,
149). In those situations, they would still permit state prisoners to file
habeas petitions. In all other cases, habeas review of state criminal
convictions would be foreclosed unless a state "were suddenly to foment a
new crisis of federalism by abdicating its responsibility to enforce certain
federal constitutional rights" (p. 104). If that happened, King and
Hoffmann would urge the federal courts to invoke the Suspension
Clause 14 and hold that their proposed streamlining statute, as applied to
criminal cases from that particular state, represents an unconstitutional
suspension of the writ (p. 104). Reliance on the Suspension Clause in this
way, they claim, would preserve the Great Writ's flexibility to respond to
future unforeseen federalism crises.
II.

THE DEFINITION OF CRISIS

King and Hoffmann argue that expansive habeas review of state court
criminal convictions is unnecessary today because there is no longer a crisis
jeopardizing the proper balance of power between the state and federal governments (pp. 65-66). What would constitute such a crisis, however, is not
clearly explained in the book. On one hand, King and Hoffmann clearly
assert that the existence of a federalism crisis sufficient to warrant habeas
intervention depends on a state's motives for refusing to enforce federal
rights: such a crisis exists only if the state refuses to enforce rights because
13.
14.

See KING REPORT, supra note 3.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c. 2.
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they are federal. 5 Note, however, that King and Hoffmann would permit
claims of innocence to remain cognizable for all state prisoners. They would
also permit more expansive habeas review in capital prisoners' cases. These
categories of permitted habeas petitions do not fit within their proffered understanding of what constitutes a federalism crisis. To be sure, King and
Hoffmann try to bring these categories within their definition. But that
attempt is not persuasive, as I will shortly explain. In the end, King and
Hoffmann's reasonable commitment to permitting federal review for
innocence claims and capital cases suggests that they are unwilling to limit habeas review as drastically as their definition of crisis would direct.
I agree with King and Hoffmann's overarching thesis that habeas should
be used to intervene when significant societal crises place the governmental
balance of powers in serious jeopardy. But I would adopt a more expansive
definition of what constitutes such a crisis. Rather than limit habeas review
to situations where states violate federal rights because those rights are federal, I would deem habeas review appropriate whenever a state
systematically underenforces or violates a federal right. After all, if a state
routinely ignores its obligation to enforce the federal constitution, such lawlessness is an affront to federal supremacy regardless of the state's motives.
In Section II.A, I explore the internal tension in King and Hoffmann's
definition of crisis. Then, in Section II.B, I explain why an interpretation of
crisis that encompasses systematic state violations of defendants' rights is
both consistent with habeas history and important on its own terms.
A. A Lack of Clarity
Relying on a historical analysis of how the writ of habeas corpus has
expanded and contracted over time, King and Hoffmann argue that federal
habeas review of state convictions is appropriate only when a state "resist[s]
enforcing the criminal procedure decisions of the Supreme Court simply
because they are federal rules rather than state rules" (p. 86). In support of
this claim, King and Hoffmann emphasize that habeas review has "twice
been pressed into service" to review state criminal convictions and that, both
times, there were "major crises of federalism" (p. 64).
First, during Reconstruction, habeas was expanded "to enforce the supremacy of federal law against potentially recalcitrant Southern states and
state officials" (p. 51). Congress enlarged federal habeas jurisdiction and
then stripped the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to ensure that lower
federal courts could force former Confederate states to obey federal law.
Once Southern resistance had waned, however, Congress restored the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court was able to
moderate the lower courts' use of habeas review (pp. 64-65).
Second, when the Warren Court incorporated many constitutional criminal procedure rights against the states during the civil rights era, expansive
habeas review was again necessary "to force recalcitrant states to obey fed15.

Pp. 66, 86; see also Hoffmann & King, supra note 8, at 53.
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eral law" (p. 65). According to King and Hoffmann, the Court's expansion
of habeas review "sent a shot across the bow of the states" (p. 89) and led to
the creation of sophisticated state postconviction proceedings designed to
give defendants an opportunity to vindicate new federal rights (p. 65).
What unifies these two time periods, according to King and Hoffmann,
is the state courts' hostility toward federal law. In both their book and their
responses to commentary about their proposal, King and Hoffmann repeatedly explain that only when state courts are failing to vindicate federal
rights because those rights are federal is there the kind of structural crisis
involving government powers that habeas is designed to address.16
As a practical matter, however, King and Hoffmann do not seem to embrace their own restrictive definition of when there is a crisis worthy of
federal habeas review. In their discussions of both the ability of noncapital
state prisoners to file innocence claims in federal court and the scope of habeas review of state capital cases, King and Hoffmann recognize other roles
for federal habeas review of state cases. Specifically, they acknowledge that
federal habeas review should be available when state procedures do not adequately protect federal rights and when there is a particularly important
interest in preventing erroneous judgments.
1. Inadequate State Procedures
In addition to cases involving "defiance by state judges in the face of
what they consider[] an unjustifiable incursion of federal law into the traditional domain of the states," King and Hoffmann also recognize a crisis
warranting federal intervention when there is a "lack of state postconviction
proceedings and remedies adequate to adjudicate defendants' constitutional
claims" (p. 105). Assuming that not every lack of adequate proceedings is
rooted in antipathy to federal rights solely because of their federal nature,
this looks like a second definition of the kind of crisis for which habeas review is an appropriate solution. King and Hoffmann do not explain when
proceedings and remedies should be deemed inadequate enough to rise to
the level of a crisis.'7 They do, however, provide one example: state procedures for entertaining claims of actual innocence.
"[T]he numerous DNA revelations of the last several years, combined
with reluctance by some state officials to act quickly to correct and prevent such mistakes, could well be characterized as a new and growing
crisis warranting federal intervention into state criminal justice."' 8 With
respect to claims of innocence that depend on new evidence obtained after
trial, King and Hoffmann contend that state procedures are "often clearly
16.

Pp. 66, 86; see also Hoffmann & King, supra note 8, at 53.

17. The interpretation of adequacy could be very narrow or quite broad. Compare my
proposed definition of adequacy, see infra Section I.B, with Senator Kyl's proposal in the
Crime Prevention Act of 1995 to limit habeas review only to claims that "the remedies in the
courts of the State are inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the person's detention,"
S.1495, 104th Congress, § 2257 (1995).
18. P. 93 (footnote omitted).
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deficient" and "will continue for some time to be inadequate" (p. 98).
They do not explain why those procedures are inadequate other than to
say that they do not give inmates "reasonable access" to evidence of innocence (p. 98). But if "reasonable access" to evidence to support a claim is
the test of adequacy, innocence claims are not the only claims that should
be cognizable on habeas.
Consider, for example, the states' complete failure to provide criminal
defendants with access to appellate or postconviction review procedures that
would allow them to vindicate their Sixth Amendment rights to effective
trial attorneys. In most jurisdictions, criminal defendants must wait until
state postconviction proceedings before they may challenge the effectiveness of their trial attorneys. 19 In these jurisdictions, defendants often must
first exhaust the direct appellate process before filing a state postconviction
petition. A majority of inmates will have served their full sentences before
they ever get to state postconviction due to the length of time it takes to process direct appeals.2 0 In some states, inmates who are not in state custody
are not permitted to file state postconviction petitions.2 ' In these jurisdictions, a majority of inmates are never given an opportunity to challenge the
effectiveness of their trial attorneys.
Moreover, even for those inmates who can file state postconviction challenges, there is no constitutional right to counsel on state postconviction
review.22 Because claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are often
predicated on what a trial attorney failed to do, these claims frequently require supplementation of the trial court record.23 Without a constitutional
right to counsel, however, most prison inmates are unable to do the necessary investigation to substantiate their ineffectiveness claims.
As a result,
24
hearing.
a
without
denied
summarily
often
are
claims
their
19. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 734-36 (Pa. 2002) (noting that the
federal courts and the overwhelming majority of state courts refuse to hear ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal); see also Eve Brensike Primus, StructuralReform in Criminal
Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 692
(2007) (collecting jurisdictions).
20. See Primus, supra note 19, at 693.
21.

See id. at 694 (collecting statutes).

22. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551, 555 (1987). As other scholars point out:
[M]any states do not provide for the appointment of counsel to assist an incarcerated
prisoner in a noncapital collateral challenge, no matter how serious his allegations and
no matter how incapable he is of presenting his own case pro se. In other states, limited
or qualified rights to postconviction counsel do exist, but other factors, such as an absence of minimum qualification requirements for counsel or extremely low
compensation rates, often result in the appointment of lawyers who neither know nor
care about what they are doing and cannot afford to perform any better.
John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 445 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
23. Primus, supra note 19, at 689.
24. Inmates in jurisdictions that permit defendants to raise trial attorney ineffectiveness challenges on direct appeal often face different procedural challenges. In sharp contrast
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In short, throughout the country, state appellate and postconviction review procedures do not give criminal defendants "reasonable access" to the
evidence necessary to assert a Sixth Amendment violation of their right to
an effective trial attorney. Because state procedures are clearly deficient,
state judges have done almost nothing nationwide to ensure that criminal
defendants receive effective representation at trial. As a result, trial attorney
ineffectiveness is rampant. Lawyers routinely fail to investigate cases before
trial, do not meet with their clients before trial, and consistently fail to file
any motions or object to inadmissible evidence offered at trial. 2 1 Public defenders regularly handle well over 1,000 cases a year,2 more than three
times the number of cases that the American Bar Association says one attorney can handle effectively.2 7
King and Hoffmann do not deny that there is a crisis of counsel. As noted
earlier, they want to devote whatever federal resources would be saved by their
proposed modifications to a new federal initiative designed to help the states
improve their defense representation systems (p. 100). But if there is a true
crisis in criminal representation, why is that not reason enough to make ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims cognizable in federal habeas
review proceedings in the same way that innocence claims are cognizable
under their proposal? In the past, King and Hoffmann have invoked their
restrictive' definition of crisis to argue that ineffective assistance claims
to the generous filing deadlines that many states are adopting to permit inmates to raise innocence claims based on new evidence (p. 98), states often have very restrictive time deadlines
for filing direct appeals-deadlines that make it nearly impossible for a new attorney to get
the trial transcript and reinvestigate the case in time to support an ineffectiveness challenge.
See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. §§ 7.211 (C)(l)(a), 7.212(A)(I)(a). Unreasonable time limits are not
the only problems in jurisdictions that currently permit defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal. See Primus, supra note 19, at 711-13
(describing the failure of some states to provide new counsel on appeal to raise these claims
and the difficulty, in practice, of obtaining evidentiary hearings to support the claims).
25. See, e.g., Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins, 236 F. Supp. 2d 750 755, 769-70 (E.D.
Mich. 2002) (explaining how two attorneys in a first-degree murder trial failed to conduct
any investigation, failed to file any motions, and failed to present any defense theory), rev'd
on procedural grounds, Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins, 374 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2004); see also
WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAt'I-rAL

CASES 3-8 (2006) (collecting instances of trial attorney ineffectiveness in capital cases).
26. See, e.g., ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAl AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
PORT ON

THE AMERICAN

BAR

ASSOCIATION'S

QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, A RE-

HEARINGS ON THE

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

CASES 18 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
damlabaladministrative/legal-aid-indigent defendants/ls_sclaid defbp.right-tocounsel-in
criminal-proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (describing jurisdictions with attorney caseloads
of over 1,000 cases per year); Primus, supra note 19, at 686-87 (same).
27. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 n.19 (2002), available at http://
www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf [hereinafter TEN PRINCIPLES] (noting the figures of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force on Courts, which provide for a maximum caseload per
year of 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200 mental health cases, or 25
appeals).
IN

CRIMINAL
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should not be cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. In King and Hoffmann's view, the states are not failing to vindicate defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights "because they are federal," and that should decide the
question.2" This response, however, is inconsistent with their arguments for
why innocence claims should be cognizable on habeas. It ignores their second definition of crisis.
States do not fail to provide adequate postconviction review procedures
for innocence claims because they are hostile to those claims. No one is
hostile to the idea that an innocent person should not be incarcerated. Moreover, as King and Hoffmann admit elsewhere, the Supreme Court has not
yet held that there is a constitutional right to be free from imprisonment if
you are innocent (pp. 95-97). If there is no recognized constitutional right
to avoid imprisonment on the ground of innocence, the states' reasons for
providing inadequate postconviction review procedures for innocence
claims cannot be predicated on hostility to federal rights.
A crisis predicated on inadequate state procedures does not depend on
the motivations that a state has for failing to enforce federal rights, and federal habeas review of such claims is not about upholding federal claims
because they are federal. Rather, it is about ensuring that a state is not permitted to systematically avoid enforcing a constitutional right, regardless of
the reasons. It is about ensuring that defendants are not precluded from enjoying their federal rights.
2. Error Correction in Capital Cases
King and Hoffmann would continue to allow state prisoners facing capital sentences to file federal habeas petitions. Indeed, they would relax some
of the procedural restrictions that are currently imposed on those petitions
(p. 152). In arguing for more expansive federal habeas review of state capital convictions, they explain as follows:
America remains deeply embroiled in an ongoing social and political crisis
surrounding the death penalty. As long as that continues to be so, habeas
corpus has a special role to play in this turmoil as it has in other periods of
social and political crisis throughout American history: habeas can ensure
that arbitrary governmental actions do not trample on the fundamental
rights and liberties of individuals. (p. 145)
As a threshold matter, it is not clear why King and Hoffmann believe that
the country is in crisis over the issue of capital punishment. To be sure,
many people are passionately opposed to the practice. But public opinion on
the issue has been relatively stable for a generation, and the politics of capital punishment rarely drive public affairs in anything like the way that the
politics of other culturally divisive issues do. In short, it is possible that
28. Hoffmann & King, supra note 8, at 53 (noting that if states were failing to vindicate Sixth Amendment rights because they were federal, "then we might still be facing the
kind of structural crisis involving government powers that habeas is designed to address," but
countering that "[w]e are convinced ... that this is no longer true").
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King and Hoffmann have mistaken a constituency's strongly held critique of
existing law-a critique which may coincide with King and Hoffman's own
normative views, and with mine-for a social and political crisis. This crisis
may be wishful rather than observed. But even if the crisis that King and
Hoffmann imagine were truly abroad in the land, it would not be a federalism crisis of the kind that King and Hoffmann claim is necessary to support
habeas review. To be sure, a "social and political crisis" about capital punishment would be serious business. But there is. no reason to think that the
crux of the crisis is a matter of federalism, much less that it is state hostility
to federal rights.
Perhaps King and Hoffmann believe that other values-like the need to
ensure that we do not erroneously execute someone-should trump their
interpretive approach to federal habeas review of state criminal convictions
in capital cases. They certainly suggest a number of reasons why they believe that "death is different" (pp. 135-45). Yet, at the same time, they also
try to fit their more expansive approach to habeas review of capital cases
into their claim that federal habeas review of state convictions is about
remedying federalism crises. Specifically, they analogize capital cases to the
second federalism crisis after incorporation. They state that "[t]he apprehension and aversion state judges may experience when dealing with the
ever-changing constitutional rules that govern capital cases are reminiscent of the reactions that prompted the Warren Court's expansive use of
habeas review in the 1960s and might justify a similar result today"
(p. 140). But their argument for why "the revolution is far from over" in
capital cases (p. 170) is speculative. They argue that because state judges
do not handle many capital cases and are inexperienced when it comes to
applying Eighth Amendment law, they will be apprehensive when they are
forced to preside over capital cases (p. 140). The authors then conclude
that "the unique challenges of this situation may generate feelings of resentment or even hostility toward the Eighth Amendment law" (p. 140).
But they offer no support for the statement that state judges are hostile to
Eighth Amendment law or that there is hostility toward that law because it is
federal. Perhaps King and Hoffmann's choice of the phrase "may generate"
rather than "does generate" or "has generated" indicates their own discomfort with their attempt to fit this part of the proposal into their federalism
crisis theme.
Later in the book, King and Hoffmann reveal a more plausible rationale
for expanded habeas review of state capital cases:
So long as the Court continues to announce new constitutional rules under
the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment, it will
continue to need the help of the lower federal courts to refine, apply, and
enforce this shifting doctrine-just as the Warren Court did when it first
announced its new due process rules for state criminal cases during the
'criminal procedure revolution' nearly fifty years ago .... And so long as a
significant portion of the judiciary and the American public remains deeply
troubled about the possibility of mistakenly executing an innocent person,
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habeas review provides a badly needed forum for the presentation of new
and compelling evidence of innocence. (p. 170)
This makes more sense. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is messy and
evolving, and the Supreme Court needs feedback from the lower federal
courts about how to apply it-not because of some hostility that state courts
have to federal law, but because we want to get it right in capital cases and
we trust the federal courts to get it right more than we trust the state courts.
Federal judges will see all of the capital cases in a district or circuit and thus
will be more experienced at dealing with them than their state counterparts.29 Federal judges are politically insulated from the pressure that
accompanies capital cases and thus can make decisions without fear of electoral consequences.30 And maybe we just care more about getting it right
when it is a capital case. But if so, maybe federal habeas review is, to this
extent, more about providing a federal forum for capital petitioners in order
to prevent errors than about restoring the balance of power during a crisis of
federalism.3
B. A Broader Definition of Crisis
King and Hoffmann are correct to suggest that the doors to federal habeas review should remain open whenever state appellate and
postconviction review procedures are inadequate. They are also correct to
suggest that some errors are simply too troubling to escape federal habeas
review. So perhaps they would do better to avoid adopting such a restrictive
view of the types of crises that merit federal intervention in state criminal
justice. Both habeas history and current practices support a broader reading
of crisis--one that would permit federal courts to entertain petitions alleging
that a state is systematically underenforcing or violating criminal defendants' constitutional rights, regardless of the reason for the state's inaction.

29. Compare p. 140 ("Most state judges never have the same day-to-day experience
applying the rules that govern capital cases."), with Gary Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARv. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 579,666-68 (1982) (arguing that federal
judges are more expert in federal law than their state counterparts), and Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1517
(2007) ("Only Article Ill judges, who unlike their state counterparts are always politically
independent and experts in federal law, can be trusted ultimately to expound that law accurately and guarantee its supremacy and uniformity." (footnote omitted)).
30. Compare p. 140 (emphasizing how state judges are "under pressure" when capital
litigation "heats up"), with Peller, supra note 29, at 666-68 (emphasizing that federal judges
are politically independent), and Pushaw, supra note 29, at 1517 (same).
31. Cf Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 992-97
(1985) ("[Sitate criminal defendants are entitled to litigate their federal claims in a federal
forum other than the Supreme Court.").
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1. Habeas History
It is understandable that King and Hoffmann's historical arguments
about habeas focus on Southern resistance to federal law. After all, that resistance was a central concern for the Reconstruction Congress that enacted

the first statute creating federal habeas jurisdiction to review state court
criminal convictions. 32 That said, one reads the relevant history too simply if
one imagines that only federalism was at stake. If a Southern state court
issued a decision that fully enforced all federal rights but, in the course of
doing so, included dicta suggesting that the court did not recognize federal
authority, the federal courts would not have jurisdiction to take that case
under the statute. 33 Conversely, if a Northern state court made serious con-

stitutional errors that resulted in the unlawful detention of a criminal
defendant, the federal courts would have jurisdiction over that case, even
though the Northern state court recognized the legitimacy of federal law and
did its best to interpret it accurately. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was

just as much about ensuring that substantive federal rights were34 enforced in
state courts as it was about bringing recalcitrant states into line.
Similarly, although there was a lot of noise in the postincorporation
years about state court hostility to federal authority (pp. 54-60), underneath
that trope lay a serious concern about enforcing the newly incorporated substantive rights themselves and ensuring that states had adequate procedures
to enforce federal rights. 35 King and Hoffmann recognize that the Warren
Court-and particularly Justice Brennan, who authored a number of the

postincorporation decisions expanding federal habeas jurisdiction-had
more than one reason for expanding habeas jurisdiction (p. 105). It was not
just about forcing states to recognize federal supremacy. It was also about
using federal habeas corpus review to catalyze the creation of better state
postconviction proceedings and remedies to vindicate defendants' constitutional rights.36 Justice Brennan did not care whether state procedures were
32. See Primus, supra note 10, at 13-14 (discussing the focus of the Reconstruction
Congress).
33. The petitioner would, under those circumstances, not be held in violation of the
laws of the United States, a violation of federal law having always been a prerequisite for
federal habeas jurisdiction. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
34. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416
(1963), when it stated that the 1867 Act "seems plainly to have been designed to furnish a
method additional to and independent of direct Supreme Court review of state court decisions for the vindication of the new constitutional guarantees."
35.
Cf CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 75-76 (Ox Bow Press reprt. 1985) (1969) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court's exe-

cution of its duty to bring states into line with federal law is what made its decisions
controversial).
36. See p. 85 ("Habeas served as a stopgap in the absence of reasonable alternatives
for judicial review and influenced the development of institutional and structural reforms to
provide such alternative review."); William J. Brennan, Jr., FederalHabeas Corpus and State
Prisoners:An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REv. 423, 441-42 (1961) (noting that "only a
few States provide a post conviction proceeding adequate to permit the state courts to vindicate
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inadequate because of hostility to federal rights or because of inertia.
What
37
was important to him was ensuring that federal rights were enforced.
The historical record thus does not require the limited definition of crisis
that King and Hoffmann initially suggest. In fact, history suggests that the
Supreme Court was willing to expand federal habeas jurisdiction whenever
it felt that states would systematically violate defendants' constitutional
rights, regardless of their reasons.
2. Current Practices
Unfortunately, states continue to systematically prevent criminal defendants from asserting and vindicating their constitutional rights. King and
Hoffmann claim that because "convicted defendants generally now have
access to state appellate and postconviction review processes in which they
can litigate their federal constitutional claims" (p. 86), the situation is much
better now than it was in the 1960s.3 8 But this misses the point. The question is
not whether the states have created appellate and postconviction proceedings.
The question is whether those procedures are adequate to allow defendants to
vindicate their federal rights.39 For many federal constitutional rights in many
states, the answer to that question is an emphatic "no."
In addition to the egregious failure of state procedures to check trial attorney ineffectiveness, many state postconviction review proceedings make
it nearly impossible for prisoners to adequately raise any claims that require
factual development. Often, states do not provide attorneys to assist prisoners in investigating and obtaining new evidence.4 ° Many states have
standards that make it virtually impossible for defendants to obtain hearings
to develop these claims.41 Without access to competent counsel and without
access to evidentiary hearings, prisoners do not have an adequate opportunity to raise a host of constitutional claims, including ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, Brady v. Maryland 42 claims that a prosecutor has unconstitutionally withheld exculpatory evidence, and claims of juror or judge bias
predicated on newly discovered evidence. King and Hoffmann rely on these
very inadequacies in state postconviction procedures to argue for an exception to their statutory scheme for claims of innocence based on new
such violations of fundamental constitutional rights" and arguing that federal habeas jurisdiction should be used to "encourage [states] to vindicate" federal rights).
37. See, e.g., Noia, 372 U.S. at 441 (emphasizing that when "the States withhold effective remedy" for federal constitutional violations, "the federal courts have the power and the
duty to provide it").
38. Hoffmann & King, supra note 8, at 53.
39. In an article outlining their noncapital proposal, King and Hoffmann state that they
"make no empirical claims about the effectiveness of present state appellate and postconviction review processes for addressing federal constitutional claims." Hoffmann & King, supra
note 2, at 836 (footnote omitted).
40. See supra note 22.
41. See Blume et al., supra note 22, at 445-47 & n.64 (documenting these standards).
42.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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evidence (p. 98). Ironically, states are likely to develop adequate postconviction review procedures to address factual innocence long before they adopt
appropriate procedures to address attorney ineffectiveness or other claims of
misconduct based on extrarecord evidence. There is no political downside
for state-elected judges to releasing concededly innocent people from prison. There is, however, a huge political downside to being perceived as soft
on crime. Because many state judges are elected,43 they are unlikely to make
the politically unpopular move of giving expansive postconviction review to
noninnocence-based constitutional claims.
If King and Hoffmann believe that it was appropriate in the 1960s for
the Warren Court to use federal habeas review to force states to develop
postconviction review proceedings (p. 65), they should similarly embrace an
interpretation of habeas review that would ensure that those proceedings
actually give prisoners a reasonable opportunity to vindicate their federal
rights. They take a good step in that direction by making innocence claims
based on new evidence cognizable. But they should not stop there.
If a state's systematic failure to provide adequate procedures for vindicating federal rights is sufficient to constitute a crisis, so too should a state's
systematic affirmative misuse of procedural doctrines to prevent defendants
from asserting federal rights.44 Similarly, when a state systematically makes
substantive errors that misinterpret federal law and lead to the wrongful imprisonment of hundreds of people, that is also an error worthy of federal
correction. At one point, King and Hoffmann argue that habeas review is
necessary in capital cases because state judges do not have day-to-day experience with capital cases (pp. 139-40). Lack of experience, however, does
not suggest the need for federal oversight as much as does evidence of routine mistakes that undermine the vindication of federal rights.
In short, there is a crisis worthy of federal habeas intervention whenever
a state systematically violates defendants' constitutional rights or systematically uses procedures to prevent defendants from vindicating their
constitutional rights. In such circumstances, the need for federal intervention is at its peak and the state's entitlement to deference is at its nadir.
King and Hoffmann resist any interpretation of crisis that would permit claims of systematic error to be cognizable on federal habeas (p. 169).
As noted above, they conclude based on an empirical study of how habeas
cases are processed in district courts that habeas is "utterly worthless" to
most petitioners and cannot "prompt needed systematic changes" (p. 169). It
is certainly true that habeas, as currently configured, provides little relief at
43. Steven P Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHi. L. REV. 689, 689-90 (1995); see Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods
in the States, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.abanet.org/leadership/fact-sheet.pdf (last visited
Sept. 1,2011).
44. Consider, for example, the practice of New York state appellate courts of systematically violating defendants' due process rights by routinely misapplying the state's
contemporaneous objection rule in ways that prevent defendants from having their constitutional claims considered. Primus, supra note 10, at 20-21 (describing and documenting this
problem).
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great cost. But we need not and should not leave habeas in its current state.
When we assess the potential of the Great Writ, it would be a mistake to
deem all of the procedural obstacles to review that now attend federal habeas to be immutable parts of habeas itself.
With respect to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, King
and Hoffmann go a step further and assert that "after-the-fact litigation
about defense counsel's effectiveness ... has failed-and will always failas a means of ensuring competent defense counsel in criminal cases"
(p. 100). This view, however, is overly pessimistic and indeed inconsistent
with their own historical account. After all, as King and Hoffmann tell us,
"The Warren Court's habeas expansion sent a shot across the bow of the
states, signaling to state legislators and judges the need to revamp the mechanisms for judicial review of criminal cases in the state courts" (p. 89). If
structured properly, why could federal habeas review not send another "shot
across the bow of the states" and catalyze state reform of indigent defense
delivery systems? When a state systematically violates its criminal defendants' constitutional rights, its state institutions are not functioning properly
and the mechanisms for judicial review of criminal cases in the state courts
need to be revised. King and Hoffmann know that federal habeas review has
served this purpose in the past. There is no reason why it cannot serve that
purpose going forward.

III.

POLITICAL FEASIBILITY

King and Hoffmann suspect that a federal habeas review system that attempts to redress systemic state violations of defendants' rights is politically
unrealistic.45 In contrast, they claim that their quid pro quo exchange of
streamlined federal habeas review for a new federal initiative designed to
combat trial attorney ineffectiveness in the states is both substantially less
expensive and more politically feasible (pp. 85, 101). But both of these
claims may be mistaken.
King and Hoffmann expect that their proposed limitation of federal
habeas review in noncapital state cases to those claims involving a retroactive application of new federal law or compelling new proof of innocence
would substantially reduce the current costs of federal habeas litigation
(pp. 91, 99). At first blush, this seems both plausible and logical. The proposal appears to limit noncapital habeas petitioners to two claims and, as
King and Hoffmann explain, only a small percentage of habeas petitions
currently contain allegations of either kind (p. 99). Upon closer examination, however, it seems likely that their proposal would not dramatically
reduce the number of habeas petitions; rather, it would change the nature of
the petitions in three ways. First, more habeas petitioners would assert
claims of innocence that would require substantial federal resources to
resolve. Second, habeas petitioners who could not assert innocence would
challenge the new habeas statute as applied on Suspension Clause grounds.
45.

See Hoffmann & King, supra note 8, at 55.
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Given King and Hoffmann's proposed role for the Suspension Clause, substantial resources will also have to be spent resolving these challenges.
Finally, those habeas petitioners who could neither assert innocence nor
challenge the statute would merely recast their petitions as § 2241 petitions 46 or petitions for original writs, requiring the federal courts to create a
new body of jurisprudence on the appropriate scope of review for state prisoner claims filed in these forms.
Moreover, even if the proposed statute could reduce costs, King and
Hoffmann propose to couple it with a new federal initiative whose costs
threaten to dwarf the current costs of federal habeas review. Some members
of Congress may be willing to entertain the proposed streamlining of federal
habeas, but there is unlikely to be much political will favoring any significant investment of resources in front-end reform in the provision of indigent
defense counsel. That would be true even under better fiscal circumstances
than the government presently confronts; in the current climate, it is particularly unlikely that the government will want to fund the proposed initiative.
Thus, King and Hoffmann's attempt at political compromise will not represent nearly the "ideological middle ground" that they had hoped (p. ix).
Rather, only one half of their proposal could gain any political traction.
Lacking broader appeal, this proposed reform would be just as politically
difficult to enact as other recent attempts to streamline habeas. 47 And if by
some chance, the half of the proposal with political traction could be enacted, it would simply curtail federal habeas review while offering no
improved means of vindicating constitutional rights in other forums.
A. Innocence
King and Hoffmann would allow state prisoners to file habeas petitions
asserting claims of innocence predicated on newly discovered evidence.
They argue that permitting these claims would not unnecessarily tax federal
resources, because only a small percentage of current habeas petitioners
allege actual innocence and because "few habeas petitioners will be able to
make even a facially plausible showing of factual innocence" (p. 95). As a
result, they predict that "habeas courts will rarely need to spend significant
time reviewing the merits of habeas petitions making such innocence
claims; most petitions will be summarily dismissed" (p. 95).
But of course, this picture would change if their proposed statute were
adopted. In a world where innocence claims and claims involving the retroactive application of new law are the only cognizable claims, many more
petitioners will raise these claims. This is particularly true given what we already know about the number of criminal defendants who receive inadequate

46. Through 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006), Congress granted the federal courts general
jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions filed by any prisoner being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
47. See, e.g., Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005),
availableat http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s 109-1088.
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assistance of counsel at trial. 48 When a trial attorney does little or no investigation, there is often new evidence that a habeas petitioner can find and then
use to make an innocence claim. To a prisoner who has nothing else to do,
even a meritless innocence claim is better than no claim at all.
King and Hoffmann underestimate the difficulty of resolving innocence
claims. As others have pointed out,49 addressing claims of actual innocence
is often a resource-intensive enterprise. This is particularly true when the
claims rely on newly discovered evidence that would require factual development in an evidentiary hearing. Even if King and Hoffmann are correct
that "only a tiny handful of habeas petitioners" would be able to produce
compelling new evidence of innocence (p. 99), many petitioners would be
able to make facially plausible claims that will require diligent federal
courts to hold evidentiary hearings.5" This does not mean that there would
be no reduction in the federal workload if other claims are not cognizable.
But it does suggest that King and Hoffmann overestimate the savings that
would accompany this part of their proposal.
B. Suspension Clause Challenges

The bigger costs of their proposal lie in the new role that they envision for
the Suspension Clause. According to King and Hoffmann, if a state were to
abdicate its responsibility for enforcing a federal constitutional right-either
by refusing to enforce the right or by creating inadequate state procedures for
vindicating the right-their proposed habeas restrictions would constitute a
violation of the Suspension Clause as applied to prisoners from that state
(pp. 104-05). Although King and Hoffmann envision few circumstances in
which state procedures should be deemed inadequate,51 some federal courts
may not agree. 52 Either way, state prisoners who cannot file habeas petitions
under King and Hoffmann's proposed statute would have every incentive to
file as-applied challenges to the statute instead.53 The federal courts would
then confront a predictably large volume of claims that the states do not
have adequate procedures in place to vindicate federal rights. The only way
for the federal courts to resolve these claims would be to conduct resourceintensive reviews of how each state's procedures actually operated in each
petitioner's case. And there is no limit to the number of potential as-applied
Suspension Clause challenges.
48.

See supra Section II.A.I.

49.

See, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 22, at 460-61.

50. See id.
51. See p. 105 ("The Supreme Court should take care not to encourage wasteful habeas litigation over alleged state-specific suspensions of the writ."); see also supra Section
II.A.1 (describing King and Hoffmann's position that only when the inadequacy rises to the
level of a federalism crisis is habeas properly invoked).
52. See supra Section 1.B.2 (documenting a number of inadequacies in state procedural rules).
53. See Blume et al., supra note 22, at 464 (noting that this would be "a litigation
bonanza for state prisoners").
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If a federal court were to find that a state's postconviction review procedures were inadequate, it would then declare King and Hoffmann's
proposed statute unconstitutional. This would be tantamount to sounding a
general invitation for habeas claims from that state. Far from saving resources, King and Hoffmann's proposal would create two tiers of federal
review for many state prisoners. First, federal courts would have to review
the Suspension Clause challenges. Then, after finding inadequate state procedures, federal courts would have to address the underlying individual
habeas petitions.
C. More § 2241 Petitionsand Original Writs

Although King and Hoffmann propose amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254the statute that currently governs federal habeas review of state court
criminal convictions-they do not seek to change the general grant of habeas jurisdiction to the federal courts contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2241, nor do
they suggest any modifications to the Supreme Court's original writ jurisdiction. As a result, they would leave the door wide open for state prisoners
to file § 2241 petitions or original writs in order to avoid the substantive
restrictions that King and Hoffmann's proposed modifications to § 2254
would entail.
King and Hoffmann recognize that federal courts would have the power
to broadly interpret § 2241 in ways that would allow them to hear claims
that would be barred under their revised § 2254 statute (p. 105). Indeed,
there is federal precedent that would support such an interpretation. In the
context of federal postconviction review of federal prisoners' claims, the
lower courts have permitted federal prisoners to file § 2241 habeas petitions
in order to avoid some of the more restrictive procedural limitations in 28
U.S.C. § 2255. 54 Admittedly, § 2255 is quite different from § 2254 in that
federal prisoners file motions under § 2255 that do not purport to be habeas
actions. Their access to the general grant of habeas under § 2241 is thus
arguably greater than that of their state counterparts. Nonetheless, King and
Hoffmann suggest that federal judges who want to avoid addressing Suspension Clause challenges to their proposed statute could simply broaden
the availability of § 2241 relief (p. 105). If that is true, the proposed reform
would merely shift state prisoners from § 2254 to § 2241, thus forcing the
federal courts (and ultimately Congress) to create an entire body of jurisprudence about what procedural restrictions should apply to § 2241
petitions filed by state prisoners.
Relatedly, King and Hoffmann do not propose any changes to the Supreme Court's original writ jurisdiction. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
54. See, e.g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997) (analyzing a
federal prisoner's claim under § 2241 to avoid the procedural restrictions in § 2255); In re
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that relief is available to a federal
prisoner under § 2241 even if § 2255 would have foreclosed relief, because otherwise there
would be a "complete miscarriage of justice" (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333,
346 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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20.4(a), the Supreme Court may grant an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus if, inter alia, "exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of
the Court's discretionary powers."55 Although the Supreme Court rule is
explicit that original writs should rarely be granted,5 6 the Supreme Court has
recently shown increased willingness to entertain original writs.57 More
prisoners have filed petitions for original writs since the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act restricted other access to federal habeas review. 8 King and Hoffmann's proposal, if adopted, would further restrict
state prisoners' access to the lower federal courts, which would, in turn,
cause more state prisoners to file petitions for original writs of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court. The Court would likely summarily deny most of
these petitions, but reviewing the petitions would require additional time
and resources. Moreover, the flood of worthless petitions would certainly
make it more difficult for the Court to find those that might be meritorious.5 9
D. New FederalInitiative
For all of the reasons discussed above, I am skeptical of King and
Hoffmann's assertion that their proposed streamlining of federal habeas review of state convictions would substantially reduce costs even if it were a
stand-alone proposal. But King and Hoffmann do not offer it as a standalone proposal. Rather, they condition their proposed streamlining of federal
habeas upon the creation of a new federal initiative to reform state indigent
defense systems (pp. 100-01). They do not discuss how much federal money they believe would be required for such an initiative to be successful, but
the number would have to be astronomically high.
Consider, for example, the problems that exist in one county public defender's office in Tennessee. In a letter sent to that county's judges in 2007,
Knox County Public Defender Mark E. Stephens indicated that misdemeanor defenders in his office were being assigned 1,841 cases per year and
felony attorneys were being assigned 1,363 cases per year.60 Given prevailing standards about how many cases an attorney can handle effectively, that
office would have to hire 31 additional attorneys just to get the caseloads
55.

SuP. CT. R. 20.4(a).

56. Id.
57. See, e.g., In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009), remanded to No. CV409-130, 2010 WL
3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010), appeal dismissed sub nom. Davis v. Terry, 625 F.3d 716
(1 th Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Humphrey, 131 S. Ct. 1787 (2011) (granting

an original writ petition for the first time in nearly fifty years).
58.

See 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 40.3 n.3 (6th ed. 2011) (noting the increase in petitions since AEDPA).
59. See p. 13 (arguing that a flood of worthless petitions "gives habeas a bad name");
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) ("He who
must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not
worth the search.").
60. Letter from Mark E. Stephens, Dist. Pub. Defender, Knox Cnty. Pub. Defender's
Cmty. Law Office, to Honorable Charles Cerny, Presiding Judge, Knox Cnty. Gen. Sessions
Court 2 (June 15, 2007), available at http://web.knoxnews.compdf/07I8stephensletter.pdf.
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down to a manageable level. 61 With the starting salary for public defenders
in that office at $43,584,61 the state or federal government would have to
channel $1,351,104 of additional funding per year into that office just to
bring caseload numbers down to what national standards recognize is the
maximum number of cases that an attorney can handle effectively.6 3 That
figure does not include funding for any training to ensure that the attorneys
are competent, nor does it include funding to ensure that defenders have
access to the investigative and research-related resources they need to perform their jobs. And that is just the cost for one office in one county in one
state. 64
King and Hoffmann's proposed front-end reform of indigent defense delivery systems would require a massive allocation of governmental funds,
not to mention significant investments of time and energy by dedicated public servants. With electoral pressure to be tough on crime and with an
economic recession that is already taxing the federal budget, it is unrealistic
to believe that the federal government would be willing to invest the time
and resources that would be required for effective front-end reform.6 5
CONCLUSION

Habeas for the Twenty-First Century does a wonderful job both of ex-

ploring the recent history of the Great Writ in all of its forms and of using
that history to develop an insightful interpretive approach to guide the writ's
evolution. I cannot do justice to the importance of Nancy King and Joseph
Hoffmann's contributions to this area. Their book will play an essential role
in academic and policy discussions for years to come.
The book's general claim that federal habeas should be interpreted as a
tool to restore the balance of power whenever a significant societal change or
crisis has placed the governmental balance of powers in serious jeopardy is
persuasive. But its application of that concept to federal review of state
prisoner petitions is too restrictive. It fails to take into account some of the
historical reasons for expansive federal habeas review of state criminal
convictions and the present reality of systemic state violations of

61.

Id. at 4-5.
62. Telephone Interview with Mark E. Stephens, Dist. Pub. Defender, Knox Cnty. Pub.
Defender's Cmty. Law Office (July 12, 2011).
63.

See TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 27 (describing these standards).
64. Unfortunately, Knox County, Tennessee is not alone in having extraordinarily high
public defender caseloads. See supra note 26.
65. As others note:
To have any chance of succeeding, the new federal initiative that Hoffman and King advocate would require, at a minimum, a massive amount of federal money, a
commitment by Congress and the President to spend that money on indigent defense,
and a willingness on the part of the states to commit their own resources to improving
defense representation. None of these ingredients are in good supply ....
Blume et al., supra note 22, at 468.

HeinOnline -- 110 Mich. L. Rev. 907 2011-2012

908

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 110:887

defendants' criminal procedure rights. It is also inconsistent with some of
King and Hoffmann's proposals for reform.
Reconfiguring federal habeas review of state criminal convictions to focus on remedying systematic state practices that have the effect of
underenforcing or violating defendants' federal rights would be more consistent with historical practice and would also give habeas a meaningful role
to play in our federalist system. King and Hoffmann are correct when they
say that the current habeas review system has become an expensive lottery
that is incapable of spurring state reform (p. 68). The answer, however, is
not to give up on habeas for the vast majority of state prisoners. Rather, we
should refine habeas to ensure that states do not routinely trample on the
constitutional rights of their citizens. If we reimagine individual petitioners
as vehicles for redressing systemic problems in states' administration of
criminal justice, we might restore meaning to federal habeas review and
prevent future crises from occurring.
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